

April 8, 2019

For Workshop on the Social Institution of Norms
University of Vienna, April 8-10, 2019

**The Fine Structure of Autonomy and Recognition:
The Institution of Normative Statuses by Normative Attitudes**

I. Introduction

In my three lectures here I will present in contemporary language what I take to be Hegel's most important ideas about discursive normativity. He thinks discursive norms are both essentially *social* and essentially *historical*. Under the first heading, he thinks that norms are instituted by reciprocal *recognition*. This is his model of how normative *statuses* can be instituted by practical normative *attitudes*, when those attitudes are suitably socially articulated and complemented. Under the second heading, he thinks that norms are instituted by the exercise of a distinctive kind of retrospective, *recollective* rationality. The *social* dimension of discursive normativity, he thinks, necessarily includes a *historical* dimension.

The ideas of recognition and recollection are two of Hegel's biggest ideas.

His story about their intimate relations, the sense in which they are two sides of one coin, is at the center of what I think we can learn from him today.

My central focus this morning is Hegel's idea that norms are instituted by *reciprocal recognition*. But I'll start with Kant's *autonomy* version of this idea. What I most want to

accomplish in this lecture is to introduce the metavocabulary for discussing normativity that I'll be using throughout these three lectures. In the next one, I'll move from general normative *pragmatics* to the norms specific to *semantics*. That requires adding to the social notion of recognition the historicist notion of recollection. In my third lecture, I'll return to practical normativity, and situate all these ideas in the larger sweep of Hegel's thought.


II. Normative Statuses and Normative Attitudes: A Regimented Idiom

First, a few preliminaries:

The aim of this lecture is to develop a regimented idiom and model to explore the development in normative pragmatics (the theory of what corresponds to Fregean "force") that takes us from Kant to Hegel. At its base is the distinction between normative statuses and normative attitudes. In the idiom of the regimentation, this distinction corresponds to Hegel's distinction between *what consciousness is **in itself*** and *what consciousness is **for consciousness***. Hegel also distinguishes, within the domain of what consciousness is for consciousness, between what a consciousness is for *another* consciousness and what a consciousness is for *itself*. This distinction is rendered in the present model by distinguishing two sorts of normative attitudes, in terms of the different social perspectives they embody: *attributing* a normative status (to another) and *acknowledging* or claiming a normative status (oneself). This additional distinction within the category of normative attitudes is matched in the model by a distinction within the category of normative statuses. This is the distinction between *authority* and *responsibility*. It corresponds, according to the interpretation being presented here, to Hegel's use of the terms

“independence” and “dependence” (“Unabhängigkeit”/“Abhängigkeit”) when they are applied to the *subjects* of consciousness rather than the *objects* of consciousness.

The structure envisaged is accordingly the following:



Elements of the model are in bold.

Modeled Hegelian phrases are in quotes.

So, in the regimented idiom of the model, the paradigmatic normative statures are identified as responsibility and authority, or commitment and entitlement. The attitudes in question include attributing these statures to another, and acknowledging or claiming them oneself. I am claiming that the vocabulary of this regimentation is not far from that Hegel himself uses, however.

Though the concern of the *Self-Consciousness* chapter is ultimately with the *subjects* of normative attitudes and statures, those attitudes and statures also have *objects*. On the side of

attitudes, what is attributed or acknowledged is just statuses of authority and responsibility. One normative subject, X, can attribute authority or responsibility to another, Y. X is then the *subject* of the attitude, the normative status attributed is the *object* of the attitude, and the subject *to* whom the status is attributed is the *indirect object* or *target* of the attribution. So, for instance, in Hegel's terminology one consciousness can be independent or dependent not only *in itself*, but also *for itself* or *for another consciousness*. In the case of acknowledgments, the subject and the target are the same—not just *de facto*, but *de jure*, as part of what it means for the attitude in question to be *acknowledgment*. Acknowledgments are to be distinguished from self-attributions, in just the way that essentially indexical uses of first-person pronouns express, by contrast to forms of contingent self-reference. So attitudes of acknowledging practical commitments can, in the central case, *be* intentional doings.

Normative statuses of authority and responsibility also have both subjects and objects. The subject of the status is the normative subject who is authoritative or responsible. The objects are what they have authority over or responsibility for. Our concern here is with the fundamental case where what one has the authority or responsibility to do (what one is entitled or committed to do) is adopt normative attitudes of attributing or acknowledging further normative statuses. The fact that the objects of normative attitudes can be normative statuses, and the objects of normative statuses can be normative attitudes means that complex constellations of basic attitudes and statuses are possible. It is in these terms that I will suggest we ought to understand both the Kantian individualistic *autonomy* model of the institution of normative statuses by normative attitudes and the Hegelian social *recognition* model of the institution of normative

statuses by normative attitudes, and the way in which the latter develops elaborates and develops the former (the sort of *Aufhebung* it is).

III. The Kantian Autonomy Model of the Institution of Normative Statuses by Normative Attitudes

If we start with two basic normative statuses, normative independence and dependence as authority and responsibility, and two basic normative attitudes, attributing responsibility or authority to another and acknowledging or claiming responsibility or authority for oneself, and think about them in the context of the idea that normative statuses might be not just dependent on normative attitudes but instituted by them, then an important compound of statuses and attitudes becomes visible. Kant's construal of normativity in terms of autonomy is at base the idea that rational beings can *make* themselves responsible (*institute* a normative *status*) by *taking* themselves to be responsible (*adopting* an *attitude*). His idea (developing Rousseau's) is that so long as the attribution of responsibility is self-consciously self-directed, that is, so long as it takes the form of *acknowledgment* of oneself *as* responsible, it is *constitutive*, in the sense that adopting that attitude is sufficient, all by itself, to institute the status.

What is it for an attitude of claiming or acknowledging responsibility to be *constitutive* of the status of responsibility it claims or acknowledges—that it *immediately* (that is, all by itself, apart from any other attitudes) *institutes* that status? As the object of an attitude, as what is

acknowledged or attributed, a normative status such as responsibility or authority has a kind of virtual existence. There need not in general be an actual status corresponding to the attitude. One subject might wrongly attribute a responsibility to another, or claim an authority she herself does not in fact possess.


Kant's conception of normative subjects as autonomous, as I am reading it, is a conception of them as able to *bind* themselves normatively by their attitudes, to *make* themselves responsible (acquire an actual normative status) by *taking* themselves to be responsible (adopting a normative attitude). In the favored cases, adopting the attitude actualizes the virtual status that is the object of the attitude. The resulting status is not just attitude-dependent (no attitude → no status) but immediately instituted by the attitudes (attitude → status). That is what it is to understand the attitude as *constitutive*.

Further, being able to adopt such immediately constitutive self*-attributions is itself a normative status. For Kant thinks that rational knowers-and-agents have the *authority* to adopt immediately constitutive self*-attributions or acknowledgments. To be a discursive being is to have the authority to commit oneself, epistemically in judgment and practically in intention (“adopting a practical maxim”). Both of these are undertakings or acknowledgments of responsibility: committing oneself to how things are or how they shall be. This *authority* to *make* oneself responsible just by *taking* oneself* to be responsible might be called the *basic Kantian normative status* (BKNS, for short). Being a normative subject, for him, is being an autonomous agent-and-knower: one that can be the subject of normative statuses such as responsibility and authority. Furthermore, one is in the end committed to (responsible for) only

what one explicitly *acknowledges* as one's commitments (responsibilities)—and for commitment that turn out to be implicit in those acknowledgements as consequences or presuppositions of them. It is that authority to make oneself responsible that, according to Kant, other rational beings are obliged to recognize, as the fundamental dignity of rational knowers-and-agents.

The basic Kantian normative status is a complex, attitude-involving status. For it is the authority (the complex status) to adopt a certain kind of attitude: an immediately status-instituting attitude, what I am calling an “immediately constitutive” attitude. This sort of attitude is an attributing of a status (in the case of the BKNS, exclusively to oneself*) such that adoption of that attitude is sufficient all by itself for the status to be exhibited by the one to whom it is attributed (in the case of the BKNS, so long as that is also the one by whom it is attributed). In Hegel's terminology, it is a way consciousness can be *for* a consciousness that is sufficient to determine that that is the way consciousness is *in* itself. For one's consciousness to be *that way for one's own consciousness is* to be that way *in* oneself.

Autonomy: The Basic Kantian Normative Status



The bulk of the *Self-Consciousness* chapter consists of an investigation of the conception of this kind of immediately status-constituting attitude. For the idea of individual attitudes of attributing statuses that suffice, all by themselves, just in virtue of the kind of attitudes they are, to institute the statuses they attribute, is the idea of Mastery, or pure independence. (What it is purified of is all hint of dependence, that is, responsibility correlative with that authority.) And that is the topic of all the allegories of kinds of self-consciousness recounted in *Self-Consciousness*.

The concept of immediately status-constitutive attitudes is an extreme version of what Hegel thinks of as the basic idea of modernity. On this rendering of the transition from traditional to modern, traditional forms of life revolved around an appreciation of the status-dependence of normative attitudes, what we can now recharacterize as the *authority* of norms over attitudes, of how what obligations and authorities there are determine what responsibilities

and authority normative subjects should acknowledge and attribute. By contrast, modern forms of life are characterized by an appreciation of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses, what we can now recharacterize as the *authority* of attitudes over norms, the way in which what obligations and authorities there are, and what they are, answers to the attributions and acknowledgments of normative subjects. The idea that some attitudes can *immediately institute* the normative statuses that are their objects, that in their case, *taking* someone to be authoritative or responsible can by itself *make* them have that authority or responsibility, is, on Hegel's view a characteristic deformation of the modern insight into the attitude-dependence of normative statuses. It is the idea allegorized as Mastery. Hegel sees modernity as shot through with this conception of the relations between normative attitudes and normative statuses, and it is precisely this aspect of modernity that he thinks eventually needs to be overcome. In the end, he thinks even Kant's symmetric, reflexive, self*-directed version of the idea in the form of the autonomy model of normativity is a form of Mastery. In Hegel's rationally reconstructed recollection of the tradition, which identifies and highlights an expressively progressive trajectory through it, Kant's is the final, most enlightened modern form, the one that shows the way forward—but it is nonetheless a form of the structural *misunderstanding* of normativity in terms of Mastery.

The claim that normative attitudes *institute* normative statuses goes beyond the mere claim of attitude-*dependence* of normative statuses. But beyond these two is the claim that at least some normative attitudes are *immediately constitutive* of normative statuses. This sort of *taking* someone to be committed is sufficient for *making* that one *be* committed. Self-

consciousness that understands itself in terms of the categories of Mastery construes normativity in terms of *immediately* status-constitutive attitudes. Hegel clearly thinks that such a conception takes the insight of modernity concerning the attitude-dependence of normative statuses too far. The form of his objection to all forms of self-conceptions that have the characteristic shape of Mastery is the same. We can think of Hegel's diagnosis of the metaphysical error that manifests itself as forms of self-consciousness understanding itself in the way characteristic of Mastery as having three levels, proceeding from the more to the less abstract.

First, it is characteristic of self-consciousness with the structure of Mastery to understand itself as being, in itself, "pure independence." That is, it conceives itself as exercising authority unmixed and unmediated by any correlative responsibility, which is normative "dependence." This, Hegel claims, is an ultimately incoherent conception. It is something the Master can be at most *for* himself, not *in* himself. As so conceived, the Master would be unable to *commit* himself, for a determinately contentful commitment involves being responsible to the *content* to which one has committed oneself, in the sense that one makes oneself liable to assessment of one's success in fulfilling that commitment (a judgment's being true or an intention successful) to the normative standard set by the content of one's status. The Master cannot acknowledge that moment of dependence-as-responsibility.

Second, as "pure independence," the Master cannot acknowledge the responsibility of his attitudes to normative statuses: the status-dependence of normative attitudes that was, Hegel thinks, a genuine insight of traditional forms of normativity (Geist), albeit one that was expressed in deformed, because one-sided, practical conceptions of normativity in terms of the model of

subordination and obedience. The question of whether the normative status the Master acknowledges or claims—what he is *for himself**—is what he *really* is, *in himself*, cannot arise within the conception of Mastery. For to acknowledge facts about what someone is *really* committed or entitled to, what responsibility or authority they *really* have, what they are *in themselves*, is to acknowledge something that serves as normative standards for the evaluation of the correctness of normative attitudes of attributing, acknowledging, or claiming those statuses. By contrast, the Master must understand his attitudes as answering to (responsible to, dependent on) *nothing*.

Finally, the Master has a conception of normative *force*, in Frege's sense of the pragmatic significance of statuses and attitudes—what one is *doing* in becoming authoritative or responsible, and in attributing and exercising authority or attributing and acknowledging responsibility—that leaves no room for the contrast and division of labor between such force and the determinate conceptual *content* of either normative states or attitudes. This, I will claim, is the form of complaint that binds together the treatment of all the forms of self-consciousness conceiving itself according to categories of Mastery. There is no intelligible semantics (account of content) that is compatible with the pragmatics (account of normative force, status, and attitude) to which they are committed. A key to this line of thought is that Hegel understands the relations between Fregean force and content, between statuses and attitudes, on the one hand, and content on the other, in normative terms of authority and responsibility (independence and dependence). Developing a lesson he learned from Kant, Hegel takes the notion of content itself to be something that must be understood in terms of the way in which to understand statuses and

attitudes as contentful is to understand them as responsible to, and so normatively dependent on, something determined by that content.


IV. A Model of General Recognition

Hegel thinks that there is something deeply defective about the idea of normative attitudes that are *immediately constitutive* of normative statuses, which lies at the core of the Kantian understanding of normativity in terms of individual autonomy. Though there is also something deeply right about the Kant-Rousseau development of the self-government tradition in the modern metaphysics of normativity, the insight it affords about normative statuses as not only attitude-dependent, but as instituted by attitudes must be reconciled with the insight that normative statuses are at base *social* statuses. Hegel's recognition model of the institution of normative statuses by normative attitudes articulates the idea that other-regarding attitudes of attributing responsibility and authority (holding other normative subjects responsible, taking them to be authoritative) are equally essential to them really being responsible or authoritative (having the statuses of being committed or entitled) as are self-regarding attitudes of acknowledging those statuses.

The social dimension provided by normative attitudes of attribution is not simply absent from Kant's picture, however. It is true that having the authority to make oneself responsible (institute that kind of normative status) by adopting a purely self-regarding attitude of acknowledging the

responsibility (committing oneself) owes nothing to its attribution by others. It is a status that is constitutive of being an autonomous discursive being, a subject of normative attitudes and statuses. And that basic constitutive normative status is not itself instituted by normative attitudes. In this respect, Kant acknowledges not only the attitude-dependence of ground-level responsibilities, but also the dependence of the status-instituting capacity of those attitudes on the normative status that is the authority to institute responsibilities by acknowledging them: the authority to commit oneself. But that status as an autonomous normative subject, the subject of commitments just insofar as one is able (has the authority) to commit oneself, to bind oneself by norms that are binding just insofar as the one bound acknowledges them *as* binding, is a constitutive kind of *dignity*. As such, it unconditionally deserves the *respect* of other autonomous normative subjects. They have a *duty*—an obligation, a responsibility—to respect the dignity that consists in the authority to make oneself responsible by taking oneself to be responsible. So Kant's picture does have a social dimension, in which attribution as well as acknowledgment plays a role. We could diagram it like this:

The Social Dimension of the Kantian Autonomy Model



This is complex interpersonal constellation of basic normative attitudes and normative statuses, in which relations of statuses as objects of attitudes and attitudes as objects of statuses are piled on one another five levels deep. As rational beings we have a standing formal obligation or responsibility (status—level 5) to respect, in the sense of attributing (attitude—level 4) to each rational being *as* a rational being, the dignity, in the sense of having the *authority* (a status—

level 3) (which we *attribute* at level 4) constitutively to acknowledge (status-instituting attitude—level 2) responsibilities or commitments (status—level 1), both doxastic and practical.

All of these elements Hegel can applaud, and they are the basis for him to say that Kant was *almost* right. He had all the crucial conceptual elements, just not arranged properly. So Kant has the idea that it is a necessary condition of *being* responsible that one *acknowledges* that responsibility. (That is autonomy.) And he does leave room for a distinction between *explicitly* acknowledging the responsibility, and acknowledging it only *implicitly*—for instance, just by being a knower and agent, thinking, talking and acting intentionally. But one might think—I think Hegel does think—that this is not yet a full-blooded sense of *being responsible*. It might well be laid alongside of another important but not yet full-blooded sense of *being responsible* that consists in being *held* responsible—a matter of *attributing*, rather than *acknowledging*.¹ Hegel claims that genuine responsibility requires *both* of these attitudes, arranged as reciprocal recognition (dual attitudes of acknowledging and attributing) of the status. His view is what one gets by accepting this Kantian picture, but treating *both* attitudes, the attribution of authority as well as its exercise in acknowledging responsibility, as necessary, and jointly sufficient, for the institution of normative statuses.

Looking at the diagram of the complex constellation of basic attitudes and statuses that make up the Basic Kantian Normative Status makes clear that although the determinate

¹ This is the pure social-status “Queens Shilling” sense of “responsible”: doing something that (whether one knows it or not) has the social significance of entitling others to attribute a responsibility. In *MIE* I try to make go as far as it can all on its own. Such an enterprise can seem perverse, but it is adopted with with Popperian methodological malice aforethought. The idea is to explore the strongest, most easily falsifiable hypothesis, to see what explanatory work it can do, how far it will take one, before its explanatory resources are exhausted.


responsibilities at the bottom of the diagram (cognitive commitments to claims and practical commitments to doings) are instituted by immediately constitutive attitudes, the authority to do that, which is autonomy, is not conceived as itself instituted by attitudes. And looking at the diagram of the social extension of the BKNS likewise makes clear that the duty to respect the autonomy of others is also a status that it is not itself instituted by attitudes. Being autonomous and having the responsibility to respect autonomy by attributing the authority to commit oneself are both statuses that are not instituted by attitudes but are for Kant constitutive of the status of being a rational, discursive being. That is why for him a special story needs to be told about how they are two sides of one coin, two necessarily intertwined aspects of one conception of such beings.

Suppose one accepted the motivations that lead Kant to the conception of the complex of basic attitudes and statuses that is the socially extended BKNS, but thought both that *all* normative statuses are instituted by normative attitudes, and that such institution requires not only the attitude of the subject of the status but also the attitude of some other who attributes it. This latter is the idea that the attitudes of any one individual normative subject can institute normative statuses only when they are *suitably complemented* by the attitudes of others. According to this line of thought, the respect others owe to autonomous normative subjects is not something *added to* the authority those subjects have, as autonomous, to institute responsibilities by acknowledging them (to make themselves responsible by taking themselves to be responsible). Recognition, the recognitive attitude of attributing the authority distinctive of autonomy, is an essential component required to institute that very authority. These are the thoughts that lead from the Kantian model of *individual* autonomous normative subjects as

immediately instituting their determinate responsibilities by their attitudes of acknowledging them to the Hegelian model of the *social* institution of normative statuses by attitudes of normative subjects that must be *mediated* by each other's suitably complementary attitudes.

What results from modifying the socially extended complex of basic attitudes and statuses that comprises both autonomy and the duty to respect it is a complex of attitudes and statuses that has a different, symmetrical, essentially social structure. At the crudest level, the structure is this:

Robust General Recognition
is Attributing the Authority
to Attribute Authority
(and Responsibility)



This is a very basic constellation of normative attitudes and statuses. I am understanding Hegel as taking *this* to be the underlying metaphysical structure of (genuine) normativity.

All that is shown here of the complex constellation of attitudes and statuses exhibited by the two normative subjects is what corresponds to the top two-thirds of the BKNS. It does not represent the specific responsibilities and other statuses that each is recognized as having the authority to acknowledge. What is represented is a structure of general recognition, not specific recognition. It represents recognition in the sense of recognizing as, taking to be, a general recognizer. This is attributing the authority to adopt attitudes that are constitutive of statuses, not immediately, but in the sense that they institute statuses *if suitably socially complemented*. In order to institute the authority to institute statuses by one's attitudes (here, attributions), one must oneself be taken to have (be recognized as having) that authority by another, whom one in turn recognizes as having that very same authority. The idea is that recognitive attitudes can institute recognitive authority just in case those attitudes are "suitably (socially) complemented" in the sense of being reciprocated. Recognitive authority—the authority that corresponds to autonomy in the BKNS, the authority to institute statuses by one's attitudes—is itself instituted by suitably complemented recognitive attitudes. It is only when those attitudes are suitably complemented that they have the *authority* to institute normative statuses. *Hegelian recognition* is what *Kantian respect* (for the authority to institute statuses by one's attitudes) becomes when that *attribution* of authority by another is understood as essential to the institution of the authority to institute statuses by one's attitudes.

As autonomous, Kantian normative subjects can, in a certain sense, lift themselves up by their own bootstraps. For they can actualize normative statuses that are merely virtual, that is, that exist only as the objects of their normative attitudes. But the authority to do that, that authority in which their autonomy consists, is not itself the product of their own attitudes, nor of

the attitudes of other normative subjects who are obliged to respect their autonomy by attributing that authority. Their possession of that authority is just a fact about them, as is everyone else's responsibility to respect it. By contrast, the recognitive authority of Hegelian normative subjects is instituted entirely by recognitive attitudes that correspond to Kantian respect for the autonomy of others. The recognitive status that is virtual as the mere object of recognitive attitudes (attributions of authority) is actualized, according to the recognitive model, when and only when the recognizing subject is recognized (as a recognizing subject) by another recognizing subject whom the first subject recognizes in turn. They do not individually lift themselves up into the normative status of having recognitive authority by the bootstraps of their own recognitive attitudes (attributions of authority), but the recognitive unit they form when their recognition is mutual *does* lift the attitudes of *both*; it does promote their statuses (recognitive authority) that are merely virtual as the objects of their attitudes up to the level of actual normative statuses. The recognitive statuses are not immediately instituted by recognitive attitudes, but they are instituted by suitably socially complemented recognitive attitudes.

V. Model of Specific Recognition

This, I claim, is the basic constellation of attitudes and statuses (we'll look further at its fine structure below) that Hegel invokes under the rubric of "the process of the pure Notion [Begriff] of recognition, of the duplicating of self-consciousness in its oneness."² He introduces the topic by saying

² *PhG* [M185].

Self-consciousness exists *in* and *for itself*, because and by virtue of its existing in and for itself for an other; which is to say, it exists only as recognized.³

What a normative subject is *in itself* is its normative statuses. What it is *for itself* is its normative attitudes. Being a subject of normative statuses and attitudes depends on being recognized as such by another normative subject. “A self-consciousness exists *for a self-consciousness*. Only so is it in fact self-consciousness.”⁴ This is the step that sees recognition, the successor attitude to Kantian respect as an essential constitutive element of the status of normative self-conscious self-hood that is the successor status to Kantian autonomy.

Furthermore, instituting a self in the sense of something with the status of a normative subject requires recognitive attitudes that are *symmetric, reciprocal, or mutual*.

Each is for the other the middle term, through which each mediates itself with itself and unites with itself; and each is for itself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own account, which at the same time is such only through this mediation. **They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.**⁵

Here we see the move from Kantian *immediate* institution of statuses by individual attitudes to the Hegelian recognitive institution of statuses by attitudes that are socially *mediated* by the attitudes of others.

Thus the movement is simply the double movement of the two self-consciousnesses. Each sees the *other* do the same as it does; each does itself what it demands of the other, and therefore also does what it does only in so far as the

³ *PhG* [P178]. [The “P” indicates this is Pinkard’s translation, rather than Miller’s.]

⁴ *PhG* [M177].

⁵ *PhG* [M184]. Emphasis added.

other does the same. Action by one side only would be useless because what is to happen can only be brought about by both.⁶

It is this symmetric cognitive constellation of basic normative attitudes and statuses that he refers to in the very next sentence as “the pure Notion of recognition, of the duplicating of self-consciousness in its oneness.” It is the basic structure of robust general recognition, in which suitably socially complemented cognitive attitudes institute statuses of cognitive authority, their normative subjects, and the dyadic community that consists of normative subjects who actually reciprocally recognize and are recognized by each other. “The elaboration of the concept of this spiritual unity within its doubling presents us with the movement of *recognition*.”⁷

Recognizing another is taking or treating that other in practice as a normative self: as the subject of normative attitudes and statuses. More specifically, in the model, it is the attitude of attributing the status of authority to institute statuses by one’s attitudes, when those attitudes are suitably complemented. This is a version of the sort of authority that is Kantian autonomy, differing in the understanding of the constellation of attitudes that can institute (actualize otherwise virtual) statuses as socially mediated rather than individually immediate. Adopting cognitive attitudes in this sense is applying to the one recognized an articulated normative concept of a self. It is consciousness of a self *as* a self. The recognizing consciousness also has that concept applied to it; it is a recognizing self *for* a recognizing self. But the self it is a self for, the one that is conscious of it as a self is not itself, but the recognized-recognizing other self. The self-consciousness that is instituted and actualized for the recognizing-and-recognized

⁶ *PhG* [M182].

⁷ *PhG* [P178].

individuals making up the recognitive dyad is a property they have *as* a recognitive dyad. It is only secondarily and as a result that it is a property of each individual. Hegel refers to the recognitive community of recognizing-and-recognized individual normative subjects as “Spirit” [Geist]:

this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I'.⁸

“Independence” is in the model *authority*: the authority of the several recognitive subjects. It is not *immediate* authority (independence), but authority that is socially *mediated* by the attitudes of others, who attribute it in recognizing the independent normative subject *as* authoritative.

“Freedom” is Hegel’s term for the symmetric recognitive constellation that integrates immediacy as the actuality of attitudes with their social mediation (through the requirement of suitable complementation of attitudes for their institutional authority).

The diagram above represents only the most general outlines of the complex constellation of basic normative attitudes and statuses that is the model of Hegelian recognition being proposed as a successor to the model of Kantian autonomy. For it characterizes only the structure of robust *general* recognition, the recognitive attitudes that institute the recognitive status of having, which requires being recognized as having, recognitive authority. What is left out of that diagram are the *specific* (nonrecognitive) statuses of responsibility and authority (paradigmatically for claimings or judgments, and intentional doings) that Kant took autonomous normative subjects to have the authority to institute by their attitudes of acknowledgment.

⁸ *PhG* [M177].

Focusing on conditions on possession of *specific* normative statuses, we can start with the one Kantian autonomy emphasizes: responsibility. Hegel does not want to relinquish Kant's insight that one is responsible only for what one acknowledges responsibility for. He wants to supplement it with the thought that it is nugatory to acknowledge a commitment unless one has licensed someone to *hold* you responsible. (Ultimately, this will be a matter of conditions of the determinate contentfulness of the commitment. Unless *administered*, the commitment is not determinately contentful.) The recognition model requires suitable social complementation of attitudes for statuses that are the objects of those attitudes to be actualized.


It follows that as with the Kantian autonomy structure, attributing a responsibility has to be complemented by the acknowledgment of the subject of the responsibility. One only *is* responsible (a status) for what one *acknowledges* responsibility for (an attitude). The status of responsibility, which is virtual in the sense of just being the object of these paired attitudes of attribution and acknowledgment, only becomes actualized—a status outside the attitudes it is an object of—when the status attributed is also acknowledged. This is just the other side of the coin of the requirement that for acknowledging a commitment or responsibility to succeed in instituting that status (for it to be constitutive of the commitment it acknowledges, for it to be a successful undertaking of that commitment, a status) someone else must both be authorized to *hold* the subject responsible (attribute the commitment, an attitude) and must *actually* do so. Kant does *not* require this social complementation of attitudes, but thinks that autonomous individual subjects just come with the authority to actualize the statuses that are the objects of their attitudes—immediately, in the sense of not depending on any other actual attitudes. And according to the social cognitive model, the same paired conditions requiring social

complementation of normative attitudes to institute normative statuses holds for attributions and acknowledgments (claims) of authority. One only *has* authority (including the authority to institute statuses by one's attitudes) if others *take* one to have that authority by attributing it. A claim of authority only actually institutes the authority claimed if others whom the authoritative subject recognizes as having the authority to do so recognize that authority by attributing it. Absent others treating one *as* authoritative, one's own claim to authority is incomplete. The authority in question is merely virtual, as the object of the subject's claiming attitude. It is a presupposition of the actualization of determinate statuses that the one who holds the first subject responsible is authorized to do so, and that that recognizing subject takes it that the first one is authorized to acknowledge the commitment. Acknowledging a status such as responsibility is suitably complemented only if some recognized recognizer also attributes it—holds one responsible. And attributing a status such as responsibility is suitably complemented only if it is also acknowledged by the recognized recognizer to whom it is attributed.


So the full constellation of basic attitudes and statuses that is the Hegelian recognitive model developed on the basis of the Kantian autonomy model (as socially extended to include the duty to respect autonomy) is more complex. It can be diagramed like this:

Hegel's Recognitive Model: Suitably Complemented Normative Attitudes Institute Normative Statuses

**An Attitude of X *Acknowledging* a Status
is Suitably Socially Complemented
IFF there is a Y s.t.:**



**An Attitude of X *Attributing* a Status
to Y is Suitably Socially
Complemented IFF:**



The attitude that is socially complemented is cross-hatched.

Resultant specific, determinate (nonrecognitive) statuses are in color.

This is the fine structure of the Hegelian reciprocal recognition model of the social institution of normative statuses by normative attitudes.

The top half of this diagram shows the recognitive dyad in which the attitude of acknowledgment of specific normative statuses by normative subject X (shown as shaded) is suitably complemented by Y's attitudes of attribution so as actually to institute those specific statuses. The bottom half shows the recognitive dyad in which the attitude of attributing of specific normative statuses by normative subject X to normative subject Y (shown as shaded) are suitably complemented by Y's attitudes of acknowledgment so as actually to institute those specific statuses. Within each dyad, the reciprocal general recognitive attitudes of attributing authority are included at the top. They differ from those in the previous, simplified, diagram of reciprocal general recognition only in that the authority that is reciprocally attributed is now articulated into authority not only to adopt attitudes of attribution of normative statuses (including specific ones), but also attitudes of acknowledgment—in each case, constitutively if suitably complemented. The specific normative statuses instituted by the suitably complemented attitudes are on the lower left of the top dyad and on the lower right of the bottom one. What one sees there is essentially the diagram of the basic Kantian normative status of autonomy. Each subject has the authority to institute normative statuses (including specific ones) by acknowledging them. The big differences are:

- *All* the normative statuses are instituted by appropriate constellations of normative attitudes—constellations in which they are suitably socially complemented.
- The attribution by others of the authority to adopt constitutive (status-instituting) attitudes, which corresponds to Kantian respect, is an essential element, a *necessary* condition, of the institution of that authority.
- The whole structure of statuses and attitudes, including other-regarding ones, in which the substructure taking the place of the Kantian autonomy structure of statuses and

attitudes is embedded, is being taken to be the context *sufficient* for the institution of statuses by attitudes.

The core idea of the recognitive model concerns what is required for statuses of responsibility and authority that are virtual in the sense of being the objects of attitudes of attribution and acknowledgment to be actualized. It is the idea that it is necessary and sufficient for the attitudes in question to be part of an appropriate constellation of other attitudes. A constellation of attitudes appropriate for realizing their objects is one in which the attitudes of attributing or acknowledging responsibility and authority are suitably complemented by other attitudes. When the statuses that are attributed to another subject are also acknowledged by that subject, and when the statuses that are acknowledged by one subject are attributed to that subject, and when the normative subjects of these symmetric attitudes generally recognize each other, then genuine normative statuses are instituted. To recognize someone in the general sense is to attribute the *authority* to adopt attitudes that will, if suitably complemented, institute statuses, that is *actualize* the statuses that are the objects of those attitudes.

VI. The Recognitive Institution of Statuses, Subjects, and Communities

VII. The Status-Dependence of Attitudes

At the center of this lecture has been an account of Hegel's successor-conception to Kant's autonomy version of the *attitude-dependence* of some crucial normative statuses, specifically

determinately contentful responsibilities, both doxastic and practical (for Kant endorsements in the form of judgments and practical maxims).

Kant combines his development of the characteristic modern idea of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses with an acknowledgment of the traditional idea of the status-dependence of normative attitudes. For Kant, the authority that is autonomy, and the responsibility that is the duty to respect (the precursor of recognition) are statuses that are *not* instituted by attitudes. They are postulated as actual authority and responsibility, that are not promoted from the virtual status of being objects of attitudes that institute them. Hegel's critique of modernity takes the form of a diagnosis of it as opposing a one-sided hypersubjectivity to the one-sided hyper-objectivity of traditional conceptions of normativity. That normative statuses are attitude-dependent is a genuine insight. But it will be understood only one-sidedly if it is not balanced by an appreciation of what was right about the traditional appreciation of the status-dependence of normative attitudes: the responsibility attitudes owe to statuses, the dimension of authority that statuses exert over attitudes. Kant has one way of combining these insights. Hegel proposes another.

The bulk of the discussion in this lecture has been on the side of *pragmatics*: the study of the normative attitudes and statuses that are the bearers of determinate content. To understand the dimension of status-dependence of attitudes, we must look also to the side of *semantics*. For the distinction between *phenomena* and *noumena*, between appearance and reality, between what things are *for consciousness* and what they are *in themselves*, shows up *both* in the form of the pragmatic distinction between attitudes and statuses *and* in the form of the distinction between senses and referents, as that semantic distinction is rendered in Hegel's terms. In pragmatic

terms, it takes the form of the distinction between what consciousness is *for* (a) *consciousness* (itself or another) and what (a) consciousness is *in itself*. This is the distinction between what a normative subject is *really* committed or entitled to, its actual responsibilities and authority, and what responsibilities or authority other subjects attribute to it, or it acknowledges itself. That is just the distinction between statuses and attitudes. Semantically, though, appearances, what things are *for* consciousness, are the Hegelian analog of Fregean senses. What those senses refer to or represent, how things are in themselves, is the reality that is the Hegelian analog of Fregean referents. Hegel accepts Kant's insight that what a representing (here, a sense, an appearance, what things are *for* consciousness) represents is what exercises a distinctive kind of *authority* over the correctness of the representing. That is what the representing is *responsible* to for its correctness, what provides the normative standard for assessments of its correctness. This is the semantic correlate of the status-dependence of normative attitudes: the sense in which what consciousness is *for* consciousness, a subject's normative attitudes, is *responsible to* (dependent upon) what consciousness is *in itself* (what it is *really* committed to or authoritative about), which accordingly exercises *authority over* those attitudes.

The relation between phenomena as representings (Hegelian senses) and noumena as representeds (Hegelian referents) is established by the process of *recollection* (Erinnerung). That is a retrospective rational reconstruction of an expressively progressive process of experience as explicitation: the gradual emergence *for* consciousness of how things are *in themselves*. There is a deep connection between this account of the process by which content is *determined*—viewed prospectively, becoming more determinate, viewed retrospectively, explicitly revealing new aspects of the always-already determinate content that has been implicit—and the relations

between normative attitudes and normative statuses according to the recognitive model of the institution of statuses by attitudes. To begin with, the context of those content-determining processes on the side of semantics is provided by the recognitive processes that institute normative statuses on the side of pragmatics. As we saw in the discussion of the *Consciousness* chapters, and will consider further in the discussion of *Reason*, content-determination is the incorporation of immediacy in the mediated form of conceptual content. Specifically, that immediacy takes the form of normative *attitudes* that subjects *actually* adopt in the course of experience, in response to collisions among attitudes they find themselves with, both through perception and through inference. Those collisions of attitudes are the experience of error. Acknowledging some commitments normatively requires sacrificing others incompatible with them. That phase of the experience of error in turn requires retrospective revisions of one's understanding of the conceptual *contents* of one's commitments: of what is *really* incompatible with what and what *really* follows from what. This final retrospective, rationally reconstructive phase of each cycle of the experience of error enforces *to* consciousness the distinction between noumena and phenomena, between how things really are and how things merely seem or appear. The form that distinction takes on the side of the subject *is* the distinction between normative *statuses*, what one has *really* committed oneself to in claiming, for instance, that the coin is copper, and normative *attitudes*, what one *takes* oneself to be committed to in making such a claim. This pragmatic distinction reflects the distinction between the conceptual contents that are Hegelian referents and those that are Hegelian senses: the appearances of those referents, what they are *for* consciousness.

Thought of from the point of view of the subject, the process of content-determination, by which noumena (referents, representeds) become something *to* consciousness distinct from the phenomena (senses, representings) that the experience of error unmasks as what things are *for* consciousness, is the emergence of the distinction between what *is* right (with respect to the relations of material incompatibility-and-consequence that articulate conceptual contents) and what *seems* right to the subject whose contentful commitments are at issue. This is just the distinction between normative *statuses* and normative *attitudes*. As Wittgenstein puts the point: “One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘right’.”⁹ Pragmatically, the question of how to understand noumena in terms of phenomena, which we have been addressing semantically, shows up precisely as the question of how it is that *attitudes* (how things seem to the subject) can institute genuine *statuses*, which are binding on and beyond the attitudes of the subject. How can mere attitudes be transcended? (Compare: How can referents become something *to* consciousness beyond mere senses, what things are *for* consciousness?) Here we have seen that the key insight motivating the recognitive model is that we can make sense of the distinction between status and attitude only if in *acknowledging a responsibility* (committing oneself) one is at the same time *authorizing others to hold one responsible*, by *attributing* that responsibility (commitment). They then can be understood as *administering a content* one has committed oneself to—a content that is *not* determined just by the attitudes of the acknowledger. To see *acknowledging a responsibility* and *attributing authority* (to hold one responsible) as two sides of one coin *both* articulates the distinction between mere attitudes and genuine statuses, *and* brings into play the

⁹ *PI* §258.


notion of *determinate content* as what one makes oneself responsible *for*. This is what the requirement that attitudes be *suitably complemented* in order to institute genuine statuses does. It makes available determinate contents, and thereby articulates the dimension along which attitudes are dependent upon statuses, in the sense of being responsible to them for assessments of their correctness: senses as answering for their correctness to referents. The status-dependence of attitudes shows up in the recognitive model as a sense in which *pragmatics* (the theory of normative *force*) is constrained by *semantics* (the theory of conceptual *content*).

Statuses are normative *noumena* (what consciousness is *in* itself), and attitudes are normative *phenomena* (what consciousness is *for* itself or for others). The story about noumena/phenomena in terms of recollection is accordingly the form of the story about the status-dependence of attitudes. Kant, having top-level *general* statuses, had this aspect of status-dependence of attitudes as well as attitude-dependence of statuses, since both autonomy and the duty of respect (the precursor of recognition) are statuses, but what autonomy is the authority to *do* is to institute statuses by attitudes, which is a form of the attitude-dependence of the resulting *specific* statuses. So Kant divided the labor: status-dependence of *general* attitudes (including the precursor of recognition—autonomy being the precursor of “suitably complementation”, as a notion of *constitutiveness* of attitudes) and attitude-dependence of *specific* statuses.

The statuses and their contents are determined by what is represented. The attitudes are can be thought of as senses, which inherit this crucial dimension of content from their referents. The *content* determines what one is *really* responsible *for*: the status to which the attitudes answer for their correctness, even though they instituted the status. That responsibility is administered by

those one has made oneself responsible *to* in endorsing or acknowledging a responsibility, those to whom one has thereby ceded the *authority* to determine what one is *really* responsible for. If there is no responsibility *to* others, then in exercising one's authority to commit oneself, one has not succeeded in making oneself responsible *for* any determinate content. *That* is the cost of not having responsibility to others, authority of others, correlative with one's own authority (to undertake responsibility).

In claiming that the coin is copper, the commitment I undertake, the responsibility I acknowledge, is not determined just by my attitudes. I have made myself responsible to the actual content of the concept copper I have applied. I have authorized others to hold me responsible, not just according to my conception of copper (what I take to follow from or be incompatible with such a commitment, a matter of my attitudes), but according to the real content of the counter I have played in the public language-game. That is what determines what I have really committed myself to, the status I have actually acquired by my performance. The essentially *social* relations between normative attitudes and normative statuses—*both* the institution of statuses by attitudes *and* the dependence of attitudes on statuses (their responsibility to statuses for their correctness)—on the pragmatic side of force, and the essentially *historical* relations between what the contents are for consciousness (phenomena, senses, representing) and what they are in themselves (noumena, referents, represented) on the semantic side of conceptual content are two sides of one coin, cognitive and experiential aspects of one sort of developmental process. A rough diagram of the story so far is this:



The retrospective, rational-reconstructive *historical* phase of the process of experience, Hegel’s “Erinnerung”, explains how, on the semantic side, objective conceptual contents (referents, noumena) articulated as laws, facts, and objects with properties both are to be understood in terms of and serve as standards for assessments of the correctness of the process of manipulating subjective conceptual contents (senses) by applying rules, propositions, and singular terms and

predicates in adopting doxastic (and, as we'll see further along, practical) attitudes. The *social* character of the recognitive process that institutes both normative subjects and their communities explains, on the pragmatic side, both how normative statuses (noumena, what self-conscious subjects are in themselves) are instituted by (and in that strong sense dependent upon) normative attitudes (phenomena, what self-conscious subjects are for themselves) and how those statuses have authority over those attitudes in serving as standards for assessment of their correctness. This is the dimension of status-dependence of normative attitudes, the responsibility of those attitudes to (Hegel's "dependence on") statuses that balances the attitude-dependence of normative statuses.

VIII. Conclusion

The recognitive model is Hegel's way of synthesizing two crucial insights. First is what he sees as the founding insight of modernity, the idea that normative statuses are attitude-dependent, as boiled down and purified in the Kant-Rousseau idea of autonomy into the idea that at least some normative statuses are *instituted by* normative attitudes. The second is what was right about the traditional idea (one-sidedly overemphasized by premodern thought) of the status-dependence of normative attitudes: the idea that our attributions and acknowledgments (or claimings) of responsibility and authority answer for their correctness to facts about what people really are committed and entitled to. The complex social-historical recognitive model of normativity is Hegel's way of performing the *Eiertanz* required to make simultaneous sense both of the institution of normative statuses by normative attitudes and of the role of normative statuses as standards for assessments of the correctness of normative attitudes. At its base is the

idea that to undertake a responsibility must always also be to acknowledge the authority of others to hold one responsible—implicitly to attribute that authority. And explicitly to attribute determinately contentful authority to someone is also always to attribute implicit responsibilities defined by that content, administered on its behalf by others to whom one has made oneself responsible by the original assertion of the authority to make oneself responsible. In the case of the attribution of authority that is general recognition, this includes acknowledging one's own responsibility to respect exercises of that authority. In Hegel's terms, there is no independence without a correlative dependence, and *vice versa*. And consciousness is essentially self-consciousness, in the sense that one cannot make sense of what consciousness is in itself apart from concern with what it is for itself. Further, it is of the essence of the recognitive model of self-conscious normative subjects that "what consciousness is for itself" is always a matter of the constellation of attitudes comprising what *a* self-consciousness, an individual normative subject, is both *for itself* and *for others* in the recognitive community that is necessarily simultaneously synthesized by reciprocal recognitive attitudes along with individual self-consciousnesses.

[End Lecture]

[8305 words]